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I. INTRODUCTION

Which of the following four problems had no clear solution in federal
law until December 2004?'
An employee is fired by his employer, a commercial
manufacturing company, for disagreeing with the employer's
religious views and refusing to attend mandatory devotion services.2
An employee, a professor in the divinity school of a religious
university, is fired because his religious views differ from the
religious views held by leaders of the divinity school.3
An employee, the building engineer of a gymnasium owned by
a church but open to the public, is fired for failing to observe the
employer's standards in certain religious matters, including
abstinence from items such as coffee and alcohol.
An employee, an evangelical Christian, is fired after her
employer, a Jewish Community Center, discovers she attended a
"Jews For Jesus" concert at her church.
The first case is the easiest, because Title VII prohibits secular
employers from discriminating on the basis of religion; the plaintiffemployee would win.6 The second case also involves well-established law.
Title VH provides an exemption - the 702 exemption - for traditional
religious organizations such as churches, synagogues, and religious
educational institutions, that allows these religious employers to hire and
fire employees on the basis of religion.7 The plaintiff-employee would
lose.' The third case seems more difficult, but the U.S. Supreme Court has

1. In each case, the employee sues the employer for Title VII religious discrimination. See
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-2 (as amended) (West 2005).
2. See EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1988).
3. See Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 198 (11 th Cir. 1997).
4. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987).
5. See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, No. Civ.A.04-430, 2004 WL 2931268,
41-42 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16,2004), reconsidered in 2005 WL 387642 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17,2005), motion
for reconsiderationdenied by 2005 WL 602969 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2005).
6. See Townley, 859 F.2d at 619.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l.
8. See Killinger, 113 F.3d at 200.
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ruled that the 702 exemption also applies to the secular, nonprofit activities
of traditional religious organizations; the plaintiff-employee would lose.9
The fourth case is distinct because the employer is neither a secular
employer, nor a traditional religious organization, nor the secular enterprise
of a traditional religious organization. The employer in the fourth case is
an independent religious organization, what this Article labels a
"parachurch organization." Parachurch organizations are not churches, nor
are they owned by churches. They are independent and, by definition, they
are religious.
For over forty years, it was unclear whether parachurch organizations
could hire and fire on the basis of religion without violating Title VII: no
one knew whether parachurch organizations qualified for the 702
exemption. In LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center
Association,'0 however, a federal magistrate judge in Pennsylvania held,
in an unpublished opinion, that a Jewish Community Center could fire an
evangelical Christian employee for religious reasons without violating
Title VII. 1' The Jewish Community Center - a parachurch organization
qualified for the 702 exemption. 2
Observers were quick to note the LeBoon ruling 3 and its significance
for parachurch organizations. 4 Parachurch organizations have been on a
collision course with Title VII for nearly forty years due to the explosive
growth ofparachurch organizations in the last few decades of the twentieth
century. One estimate put the number of parachurch organizations
operating in the United States at nearly 30,000. " Parachurch organizations
have combined estimated annual budgets in the billions of dollars 6 and
serve millions of Americans every year.17 Moreover, the interest of

9. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339.
10. LeBoon,2004 WL 2931268.
11. Id. at *3.
12. Id. at *6. This Article uses "parachurch organizations" as a term of art that applies to all
qualifying organizations without regard to their specific religion.
13. See Shannon P. Duffy, 'Jewsfor Jesus' ConcertgoerLoses Employment Suit Against
Jewish Center, Law.com, at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1103549723229 (Dec. 21,
2004).
14. Ted Olsen, Weblog: Bad News for Fired Christian is Good News for Christian
Organizations,ChristianityToday.com, at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2004/l51/21.0.html
(Dec. 21, 2004).
15. Michael S. Hamilton, We're in the Money!, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, June 9, 2000,
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2000/007/1.36.html.
16. Id; Tim Stafford, Anatomy of a Giver, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, May 19, 1997, at 20, 23.
17. See, e.g., WESLEY K. WILLMER ET AL., THE PROSPERING PARACHURCH: ENLARGING THE

BOUNDARIES OF GOD'S KINGDOM 3 (1998) (stating that "James Dobson's popular radio program
Focus on the Family is heard by over two million listeners every weekday"). See also John
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parachurch organizations in hiring employees of the same faith is oftenjust
as strong as that of traditional churches, synagogues, and mosques.
A standard contrary to the ruling in LeBoon would have been disastrous
for parachurch organizations. This Article shows why. Section II defines
and illustrates parachurch organizations. Section III outlines the content
and scope of the 702 exemption. Section IV provides a comprehensive
overview of the relevant federal case law, analyzes what types of
organizations have and have not qualified for the 702 exemption, and
includes a discussion of the LeBoon case. Section V discounts the method
of statutory interpretation one circuit court used in narrowly construing the
702 exemption. The Article concludes with a discussion of why parachurch
organizations should qualify for the 702 exemption.

II. PARACHURCH ORGANIZATIONS

A. A Survey and BriefHistory of ParachurchOrganizations
Although parachurch organizations have existed in some form since at
least the early nineteenth century,1 8 the term "parachurch" was probably
first used in the late 1960s."9 Since then, parachurch organizations have

McCarthy & Jim Castelli, Religion-SponsoredSocialService Providers:The Not-So-Independent
Sector 23 (The Aspen Institute, Nonprofit Sector Research Fund, Working Paper Series 1998)
(stating they believe that "tens of millions" of people are served annually by religion-sponsored
social service organizations - a category that is at once broader than the parachurch category but
limited to only social service providers), available at http://www.nonprofitresearch.org/
usr-doc/25356.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
18. See Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent andDisestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1385, 1549 (2004) (noting the American Bible
Society and the American Board ofCommissioners for Foreign Missions). Earlynineteenth-century
"parachurch organizations were abundant in many forms - Bible tract societies, independent
educational organizations, independent missionary groups, and moral reform organizations." Jeffrey
K. Hadden, ParachurchOrganizations,Religious Broadcasting, at http://religiousbroadcasting.lib.
virginia.edu/parachurch.html (July 8, 1999). Apparently, there was sufficient pre-Civil-War
parachurch activity for evangelicals to assemble a cohort of parachurch organizations called the
Evangelical United Front. Hamilton, supra note 15. Furthermore, at least one commentator points
to even earlier roots of the modem parachurch: "In American history, the idea that local charitable
institutions not controlled by the churches should flourish goes back to the Puritans, beginning in
England." Gary North, The Rise of the ParachurchMinistries,TENTMAKERS (Sept./Oct. 1982), at
1, availableat ftp://entrewave.com/freebooks/docs/apdfs/newslet/north/8209.pdf
19. WILLMERETAL., supranote 17, at 12 (stating that the word parachurch "was first applied
to small gatherings of Christians that took place outside institutional churches").
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ministr[ies],"2 "special purpose groups," 21
been referred to as "social
22
"voluntary societies,

"faith-based nonprofits, ' ' 23 and "specialized
institutional ministries., 24 Readers may be familiar with such well known
and historic parachurch organizations as the Salvation Army, 25 Catholic
Charities, Habitat for Humanity, and Bread for the World.26 Parachurch
organizations like these have religiously-motivated yet primarily social
objectives, whereas many early American parachurch organizations, such
as the American Bible Society and the American Board of Commissioners
28
for Foreign Missions,2 7 had "primarily religious objectives.,
Today, parachurch organizations of both types exist in large numbers.
One "informed estimate ' 29 puts the number of evangelical Christian
parachurch organizations at over 30,000.30 Another estimate speculates that
the combined budgets of all categories of evangelical Christian parachurch

20. Carl H. Esbeck, Government Regulation ofReligiously Based Social Services: The First
Amendment Considerations,19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 343,347 (1992) (noting attempts by courts
and legislatures to distinguish "a social ministry from its affiliated church or other core religious
community").
21. John A. Coleman S.J., Religiously BasedMorality: Its ProperPlace in American Law
andPublicPolicy?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 279,290 (200 1) (characterizing "para-church special
purpose groups" as "independently incorporated and autonomous from congregations and
denominations").
22. Esbeck, supra note 18, at 1549 (discussing early American forms of parachurches as
"voluntary societies" and "parachurch agencies" that "worked alongside churches while making no
claim to be a church").
23. Nonprofit Sector Research Fund-Projects & Findings, at http://www.nonprofitresearch.
org/newsletterl 531/newsletter show.htm?doc id= 17388 (last visited Mar. 19,2006) (summarizing
report authored by Robert Wuthnow and described as "Linkages Between Religious Congregations
and Nonprofit Service Organizations").
24. Darrel W. Cox, Why ParachurchLeaders Must Meet the Same Biblical Qualifications
as Church Leaders, at 3, The Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood, at http://www.
cbmw.org/resources/articles/parachurch.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
25. One commentator has described the Salvation Army as "a unique combination ofholiness
denomination and parachurch agency devoted to human services." Hamilton, supranote 15.
26. See Coleman, supranote 2 1, at 290. Although Coleman characterizes the Salvation Army
and Catholic Charities as "para-church organizations" and Habitat for Humanity and Bread for the
World as "para-congregational organizations," the distinction is irrelevant for present purposes.
27. Esbeck, supra note 18, at 1549.
28. Id. at 1550.
29. Hamilton, supranote 15.
30. Id. This estimate was published in 2000. A more conservative estimate, published ten
years earlier, puts the number closer to 10,000. DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 864
(Daniel G. Reid et al. eds., Intervarsity Press 1990).
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organizations is $22 billion.3 One church growth expert estimates a 1996
total parachurch budget of $100 billion.32 These massive numbers, even if
high, suggest 3the
phenomenal growth of this "new form of religious
3
organization.
A striking feature of American parachurch organizations is that they
have been almost exclusively the product of evangelical Christendom.34
According to the Dictionary of Christianity in America, "[1] iberal versions
of the large nondenominational parachurch organizations have ...been
almost nonexistent., 35 This might be because conservative Christians were
essentially forced out of the more liberal mainstream denominations in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 36 As evangelicals left liberal
mainstream denominations, they were forced to become more
entrepreneurial" and pioneering 38 than their liberal counterparts. The

31. Hamilton, supra note 15. "Church-growth expert David Barrett... calculates that...
[by] 1996... parachurches had outgrown churches in total budget, $100 billion to $94 billion."
Stafford, supra note 16, at 23.
32. Stafford, supranote 16, at 23.
33. Hadden, supra note 18.
34. Evangelical parachurch organizations raise more money than mainline denominations,
according to one commentator:
Of the nine largest parachurch organizations in the U.S. devoted to spreading the
gospel, eight are evangelical, with combined 1998 budgets of $729 million. Of the
seven largest communications media agencies, six are evangelical, with total
budgets of $625 million. In foreign ministry and missions, evangelicalparachurch
agencies raise $1.5 billion per year, while evangelicaldenominations raise another
$1 billion. Mainline denominations and the independent agencies associated with
them together raise less than $500 million.
Hamilton, supra note 15 (emphasis added).
35. DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIANITY INAMERICA, supra note 30, at 863.
36. Hamilton, supranote 15 (stating that evangelicals turned to parachurch models "as more
and more evangelicals found themselves without voice in the major denominations"); DICTIONARY
OF CHRISTIANITY INAMERICA, supranote 30, at 864 ("[D]uring the 1920s when the fundamentalistmodernist controversies took place in the major denominations, conservative evangelicals came to
rely even more heavily on... parachurch agencies ... "And, "When the fundamentalists withdrew
from their traditional denominations, most of the denominations chose to adopt more liberal
policies, and fundamentalists adopted independent parachurch agencies to fulfill their missions.");
William Martin, How the Fundamentalists Learned to Thrive, RELIGION-ONLINE, at
http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=153 (last visited Mar. 19, 2006) (discussing
JOELCARPENTER, REVIVE Us AGAIN: THE REAWAKENING OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISM (1997)
("Having left or been driven out of mainline denominations, fundamentalists replaced the services
and associations they had lost by turning increasingly to an elaborate network of parachurch
agencies.")).
37. More than one commentator has noted the entrepreneurial spirit of parachurch leaders.
See Hamilton, supranote 15 (stating that "[e]vangelicals became religious entrepreneurs"); Hadden,
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autonomous structure of parachurch organizations gave evangelicals a
"much greater degree of flexibility for innovation than... [was] possible
within ... [the] established organizational hierarchy"39 of the mainline
denominations they left.
Indeed, not only have parachurch organizations "become the primary
means of cooperative endeavor [among evangelical Christians],"''4 but at
least one observer has suggested that evangelicalism actually can be
defined in terms of the non-hierarchical form of parachurch
organizations,41 "insofar as evangelicalism is defined at all."'' 2
Not surprisingly then, although parachurch organizations exist in
Judaism, 4 3 Islam," Buddhism,45 and various other religions' and

supra note 18 (stating that "[p]arachurches are often the creation of an entrepreneaur [sic]");
WILLMER ET AL., supra note 17, at 46-49 (stating that one of the five keys to parachurch
effectiveness is "approach[ing] ministry as an entrepreneur").
38. One parachurch observer attributes heavy parachurch growth in part to "the frontier view
of life":
Four characteristics of the frontier mind we Americans inherit still serve to
increase our enthusiasm for the parachurch alternative: (1) less respect for tradition
and traditional social structures; (2) communalism - an attitude favoring the
autonomy of one's own community or group; (3) self-reliance and an independent
spirit; (4) infatuation with almost anything new.

J. Alan Youngren, ParachurchProliferation:The FrontierSpirit Caughtin Traffic, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY, Nov. 6, 1981, at 39.

39. Hadden, supra note 18. One legal scholar notes an advantage gained by the early
nineteenth century parachurch organizations: "By focusing on ... [specific social ills or specific
mission objectives], the voluntary societies did not get sidetracked by doctrinal differences among
the denominations." Esbeck, supra note 18, at 1549.
40. DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIANITY INAMERICA, supra note 30, at 864.
41. Elesha Coffinan, Don't Touch That Dial, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Mar. 8, 2002,
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2002/108/53.0.html.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Jewish Defense League (stating that "[t]he Jewish Defense League came into
being to educate the Jewish people to the concept of Ahavat Yisroel - one Jewish people,
indivisible and united, from which flows the love for and feeling of pain of all Jews") (on file with
author); Jews for Judaism (stating it has "become the Jewish community's leading response to the
multi-million dollar efforts of cults and evangelical Christians who target Jews for conversion"),
http://www.jewsfojudaism.org/web/mainpages/mission.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2006); Jewish
Prisoner Services International (stating that "[i]ts mission is to provide direct spiritual, outreach and
advocacy services for Jewish prisoners and their loved ones while concurrently working in
conjunction with several major Jewish organizations and social service agencies"), http://
www.jewishprisonerservices.org/about.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
44. See, e.g., Islamic Broadcasting Network, (stating that its "main mission ... is to share the
guidance of Allah through broadcast media and the internet, to encourage the right and discourage
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movements,47 the parachurch literature has focused primarily on Christian
parachurch organizations. And, there is no dearth of Christian parachurch49
activity.48 Christian seminaries now offer courses in parachurch ministry.

the wrong, and to provide the American Muslim community with programming that will cater
towards their needs"); Council on American-Islamic Relations (stating that it is a "nonprofit...
civil rights and advocacy group" whose mission is "to enhance understanding of Islam, encourage
dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote
justice and mutual understanding"), http://www.cair-net.org/default.asp?Page=About (last visited
Mar. 19, 2006).
45. See, e.g., Buddha's Light International Association World Headquarters, (stating its
"hope [that] the seed of joy is sowed throughout the world" and that it "works closely with
members of other Buddhist temples, colleges, scholastic organizations, lay practitioners
associations, and meditation groups"), http://www.blia.org/english/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2006);
World Fellowship of Buddhist Youth (stating that its purpose is, among other things, "[t]o promote
and strengthen among the younger generations observance and practice of the teachings of Lord
Buddha"), http://www.wfby.org/aboutobjective. html (last visited Mar. 19,2006); Buddhist Peace
Fellowship (stating that its mission "is to serve as a catalyst for socially engaged Buddhism" and
that its "programs, publications, and practice groups link Buddhist teachings of wisdom and
compassion with progressive social change"), http://www.bpf.org/html/aboutus/mission/mission.
html (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
46. See, e.g., Sambodh Society, Inc. (Hindu group declaring as its three goals: "To promote
understanding of India's ancient spiritual heritage, particularly through teaching ofthe Upanishads,
the Bhagavad Gita, the Yoga Sutras and the Vedantic philosophy of the Hindu philosopher,
Sankaracharya;" "To activate the inner spiritual power of individuals via instruction in meditation;"
and, "To turn this power towards active and constructive social service."), http://www.sambodh.
corn/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2006); Institute for Applied Spiritual Technology (Hare Krishna group
stating that "we recognize the need to apply our system of transcendental knowledge, based on the
ancient Vedic teachings, to train interested seekers to become God-awakened spiritual warriors"),
http://www.ifast.net/about.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
47. Artists for Israel International (Messianic Jewish group group describing itself as "a major
world outreach agency with a cinema media Bible, a Messianic Bible Society featuring THE
ORTHODOX JEWISH BIBLE in many languages, an online advanced Biblical Studies Program,
ministry to Muslims, and a Messianic Yeshiva"); Citizens Commission on Human Rights
(Scientologist group describing itself as a "public benefit organization" that is "dedicated to
investigating and exposing psychiatric violations of human rights"), http://www.cchr.org/what/
index.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006); American Atheists (Atheist group declaring that it "is
dedicated to working for the civil rights of Atheists, promoting separation of state and church, and
providing information about Atheism"), http://www.atheists.org/visitors.center/about.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2006).
48. The president of Taylor University in Upland, Indiana, commented in 1992, "The
proliferation of parachurch ministries seems to have reached the saturation point, or perhaps run
up against the barrier of economic resources." Kesler, infra note 80, at 18, 19.
49. See, e.g., Tyndale University College & Seminary (offering a course entitled Parachurch
Youth Ministry), http://www.tyndale.ca/universitycollege/printcourse.php?cid=631 (last visited
Mar. 19, 2006); Denver Seminary (offering an entire Parachurch Ministry Training Center),
http://www.denverseminary.edu/tm/trainingcenters/parachurch.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
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Christian parachurch organizations exist for women,' ° men," youth,52
families,53 college students,54 homeless people, 55 military personnel,56
prisoners,57 truckers,58 golfers,59 athletes, 6° motorcyclists, 6 alcoholics,6 2 and

50. See, e.g., Moms in Touch, Int'l (stating as its purpose, in part: "To provide support and
encouragement to moms who carry heavy burdens for their children." And, "To pray that teachers,
administrative staff, and students would come to faith in Jesus Christ."), http://www.momsintouch.
org/NewDesign/aboutus.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006); Women of Faith (describing itself as an

"interdenominational women's conference organization" whose objective is "[t]o see women set
free to a lifestyle of God's grace"), http://www.womenoffaith.com/About/companyoverview.asp
(last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
51. See, e.g., Promise Keepers (stating that it "is dedicated to igniting and uniting men to be
passionate followers of Jesus Christ through the effective communication of the 7 Promises"),
http://www.promisekeepers.org/corel 0 (last visited Mar. 19, 2006); International Christian Men's

Institute (helping men understand that "manhood and Christlikeness are synonymous"),
http://www.icmi.info/default.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2006) ; Christian Businessmen's Network
International (describing itself as "network of business and professional leaders seeking to reach
their peers with the Gospel of Jesus Christ"), http://www.cbmcint.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2006).
52. See, e.g., Youth for Christ (stating that its mission is "to participate in the body of Christ
in responsible evangelism of youth, presenting them with the person, work and teachings of Christ
and discipling them into the local church"), http://community.gospelcom.net/Brix?pagelD= 12575
(last visited Mar. 19, 2006); Young Life (stating as its mission: "Introducing adolescents to Jesus
Christ and helping them grow in their faith."), http://www.younglife.org/pages/ylmission.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2006).
53. See, e.g., Focus on the Family (stating as its mission to "disseminat[e] the Gospel of Jesus
Christ to as many people as possible ... by helping to preserve traditional values and the institution
of the family"), http://www.family.org/welcome/aboutfof/a0005554.cfm (last visited Mar. 19,
2006); Family Life (Family Life is a parachurch organization that is actually a division of another
parachurch organization, Campus Crusade for Christ International whose mission is to "effectively
develop godly families who change the world one home at a time"), http://www.familylife.com/
about/searchfaq.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
54. See, e.g., Campus Crusade for Christ (stating that its campus ministry has a presence on
1029 campuses internationally and that its mission is to "win the campus today and change the
world tomorrow"), http://www.campuscrusadeforchrist.com/aboutus/index.htm (last visited Mar.
19, 2006); Intervarsity Christian Fellowship USA (Stating that its purpose is "to establish and
advance at colleges and universities witnessing communities of students and faculty who follow
Jesus as Savior and Lord: growing in love for God, God's Word, God's people of every ethnicity
and culture and God's purposes in the world."), http://www.intervarsity.org/aboutus/purpose.php
(last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
55. See, e.g., Pacific Garden Mission (stating that it "desire[s] to bring each ... [homeless
person who visits the shelter] to salvation and maturity in Christ"), http://www.pgm.org/abtfaq.
html (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
56. See, e.g., Christian Military Fellowship (stating that it "is an association of believers who
are committed to evangelizing the United States armed forces and discipling Christians who are in
the military"), http://www.cmfhq.org/AboutUs/AboutUs.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
57. See, e.g., Prison Fellowship (stating that it "reaches out to prisoners, ex-prisoners, and
their families both as an act of service to Jesus Christ and as a contribution to restoring peace to our
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sex addicts.63 Christian parachurch organizations are involved in theater,'
television," radio,' film, 67 media consulting, 6 news, aviation, 7° financial

cities and communities endangered by crime."), http://www.pfn.org/AM/Template.cftn?Section=
AboutPrisonFellowship 1&CONTENTID= 14397&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfln (last
visited Mar. 19, 2006).
58. See, e.g., Truckers for Christ (stating that its purpose is to "provide fellowship,
encouragement and support to Christian drivers and to aid in introducing non-Christian drivers to
the Lord"), http://www.truckersforchrist.org/statement.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
59. See, e.g., Christian Golfers Ministry (stating its ministry is "designed for... the golfer,
who desires and needs a way to share Christ with other golfers" and that golfing relationships "give
perfect opportunities to share our Savior"), http://www.golftninistry.com/intro.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2006).
60. See, e.g., Fellowship of Christian Athletes (stating that its mission is "[t]o present to
athletes and coaches and all whom they influence the challenge and adventure of receiving Jesus
Christ as Savior and Lord"), http://www.fca.org/aboutfca/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
61. Motorcyclists for Jesus (stating that it "is a non-profit, democratic, member driven group
of Christian motorcyclists." And, "[t]he organization's main purpose is to lead and guide
motorcyclists in the personal relationship with Jesus Christ."), http://www.go2mjm.com/mission.
htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006); Christian Motorcyclists Association (stating that it is "dedicated
to reaching people for Christ in the highways and byways through motorcycling"),
http://www.cmausa.org/cmausa.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
62. See, e.g., Alcoholics Victorious, (stating that its "support groups offer a safe environment
[for] recovering people who recognize Jesus Christ as their 'Higher Power' and that it uses both
the 12 Steps and the Alcoholics Victorious Creed), http://crc.iugm.org/ (last visited Mar. 19,2006).
63. See, e.g., RSA Ministries (stating that it is a "Christ-centered, 12-Step Recovery program
for those struggling with compulsive sexual behavior"), http://www.rsaministries.org/ (last visited
Mar. 19, 2006).
64. See, e.g., Lamb's Players Theater, http://www. lambsplayers.org/aboutus/greeting.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2006), discussed in Carol R. Thiessen, Lambs in Actors' Clothing,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, May 14, 1990, at 69,69 (describing the Lamb's Players as"[a]n early effort"
to achieve "an idea for Christian street theater, and eventually full-blown drama performed by
Christians in a professional setting"). It is not clear from the Lamb's Players Theater web site
whether the organization maintains a Christian identity or whether the organization ever maintained
an explicit Christian identity.
65. See, e.g., Christian Broadcasting Network ("The mission of CBN and its affiliated
organizations is to prepare the United States of America and the nations of the world for the coming
of Jesus Christ and the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. We are achieving this end
through the strategic use of mass communications, especially television and film, the Intemet and
), https://www.cbn.com/about/
New Media, radio; the distribution of cassettes, literature ....
mission/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
66. See, e.g., K-LOVE Radio Network (providing a variety of Christian radio programming),
http://www.klove.com/Interact/ Links.aspx#On-AirMinistries (last visited Mar. 19, 2006). KLOVE "has stations and translators across the United States." K-LOVE, http://www.klove.com/
Music/StationList.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
67. See, e.g., World Wide Pictures ("World Wide Pictures [a ministry of the Billy Graham
Evangelistic Association] support[s] the ministry and calling ofBilly Graham... by producing and
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counseling,71 marriage enrichment,72 public policy," evangelism,7" legal
advocacy, 75 arbitration, 76 and more. 77 Parachurch organizations serve

distributing high-quality audio-visual evangelistic presentations."), http://www.billygraham.org/
WWP_FAQ.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
68. See, e.g., Mastermedia International ("Mastermedia is a nonprofit media organization
committed to serving media leaders with professional consulting regarding America's Christian
market and personal counsel concerning issues of faith."), http://www.mastermediaintl.org/guest/
about/Iabout.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
69. See, e.g., The Christian Examiner (describing itself as an "independent Christian
newspaper published in local editions... with 185,000 copies per month distributed to more than
5,000 locations"), http://www.christianexaminer.com/Pages/Aboutus.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2006).
70. JAARS (stating that it supports Bible translation efforts and related ministries through
coordination and training in aviation and other support areas), http://www.jaars.org/factsheet.shtml
(last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
71. See, e.g., Crown Financial Ministries ("Equipping people worldwide to learn, apply, and
teach God's financial principles so they may know Christ more intimately, be free to serve Him, and
help fund the Great Commission."), http://www. crown.org/AboutUs/default.asp (last visited Mar.
19, 2006).
72. See, e.g., Marriage Alive (Stating that its mission "is to identify, train and empower
leaders who invest in others by building strong marriage and family relationships through the
integration of Biblical truth, contemporary research, practical application and fun."),
http://www.marriagealive.com/About/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
73. See, e.g., Concerned Women for America (describing itself as "the nation's largest public
policy women's organization" whose mission is "to protect and promote Biblical values among all
citizens"), http://www.cwfa.org/about.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2006); Family Research Council
(stating that it "champions marriage and family as the foundation of civilization... shapes public
debate and formulates public policy.., and promotes the Judeo-Christian worldview as the basis
for ajust, free, and stable society"), http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?c=HISTORYABOUT (last visited
Mar. 19, 2006).
74. Billy Graham Evangelistic Association (stating that it "exists to support the evangelistic
ministry and calling of Mr. Graham to take the message of Christ to all we can by every prudent
means available to us"), http://www.bgea.org/AboutUs_Index.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
75. See, e.g., American Center for Law and Justice (stating that it is "dedicated to the concept
that freedom and democracy are God-given inalienable rights" and that it is "dependent upon God
and the resources He provides through the time, talent, and gifts of people who share our
concerns"), http://www.aclj.org/About/default.aspx?Section--9 (last visited Mar. 19,2006); Liberty
Counsel (stating that it "is a nonprofit litigation, education and policy organization dedicated to
advancing religious freedom, the sanctity of human life and the traditional family"),
http://www.lc.org/aboutus.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
76. See, e.g., Peacemaker Ministries (stating that its mission is "to equip and assist Christians
and their churches to respond to conflict biblically") (emphasis omitted), http://www.hispeace.org/
html/org.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
77. See, e.g., McCarthy & Castelli, supra note 17, at 15 (providing examples of freestanding
religion-sponsored social service delivery organizations, including, "Crisis Pregnancy Centers, daycare facilities, rehabilitation programs, health clinics, orphanages, homes for the aged, and housing
programs").
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millions of American people each year.7' The proliferation and public
presence of parachurch organizations is a genuine social phenomenon.7 9
B. UnderstandingParachurchOrganizations
A key point of tension in defining parachurch organizations is the
relationship between parachurch organizations and traditional churches or
denominations.8" Although some scholars stress the inherent association
between parachurches and traditional churches, 8' another view is that
parachurches "stand outside of the organizational structure of wellestablished religious bodies."82 This Article understands "parachurch
organizations" to be independent of more traditional religious
organizations.83

78. See, e.g., WILLMER ET AL., supra note 17, at 3 (stating that "James Dobson's popular
radio program Focus on the Family is heard by over two million listeners every weekday"). See also
McCarthy & Castelli, supranote 17, at 23 (stating they believe that "tens of millions" of people are
served annually by religion-sponsored social service organizations - a category that is at once
broader than the parachurch category but limited to social service providers.).
79. The phenomenon of evangelical Christian and other parachurch organizations - which
are, by definition, religious organizations - should be distinguished from America's love affair
with voluntary and humanitarian associations more generally. At least one legal scholar has noted
Alexis de Tocqueville's observations about the proliferation of early American voluntary societies.
See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 18, at 1549 (quoting Tocqueville as saying: "Americans of all ages,
all stations in life, and all types of dispositions are forever forming associations.").
80. WILLMER ET AL., supra note 17, at 13 (stating that parachurch organizations are
controversial precisely because the role of parachurch organizations is increasingly insubordinate
to the role of local churches: "These groups.., have taken on a life of their own."). See Jay Kesler,
Guest Editorial, Vision Quest, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct. 5, 1992, at 18, 19 ("The cleavage and
competition between church and parachurch must end, and both accountability and resources must
come from a gathered, spiritually united church."). Indeed, parachurch organizations were
scrutinized at least as early as 1826, when John Leland wrote: "Religion is become the most
fashionable thing among us. Moral societies, Sunday schools - tract societies - Bible societies,
missionary societies, and funds to educate and make preachers, are now in the full tide of
operation." Melissa Rogers, Traditions of Church-State Separation: Some Ways They Have
ProtectedReligionandAdvancedReligiousFreedom andHow They are ThreatenedToday, 18 J.L.
& POL. 277, 321 n.61 (2002) (citing Lyman H. Butterfield, Elder John Leland, Jeffersonian
Itinerant,62 PROC. OF THE AM. ANTIQUARIAN Soc'Y 234 (1952)).
81. See, e.g., Cox, supranote 24, at 4 (arguing that Christian leadership, including leadership
within Christian parachurch organizations, "is by [its] very nature recognized and validated within
the context of the local church").
82. Hadden, supranote 18 (casting this quality of parachurch organizations as "[t]he defining
characteristic").
83. Institutional independence is stressed in this definition of parachurches: "[Parachurch
organizations are] [v]oluntary, not-for-profit associations of Christians working outside
denominational control to achieve some specific ministry or social service." DICTIONARY OF
CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA, supranote 30, at 863, quoted in WILLMERETAL., supranote 17, at 13.
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"The defining characteristic of a parachurch [organization] is that it
stands outside of the organizational structure of well-established religious
bodies."84 Parachurch organizations are not owned or operated by
churches.85 Although religion-based social service groups are often
associated with local church congregations86 or regional/national religious
denominations,87 these groups simply do not qualify as parachurch
organizations. Independence is the key institutional aspect of parachurch
organizations.8 8

Put similarly: "[Parachurch] work... [is] not-for-profit, organized Christian ministry to spiritual,
mental, and physical needs, working outside denominational control." Youngren, supra note 38,
at 38, quoted in WLLMER ET AL., supra note 17, at 13. Another definition of parachurch
organizations might understand the element of independence in this way: "[Parachurch
organizations are] religious groups and organizations that are consciously religious but do not claim
to be a church in the narrow sense of an organization attended by clergy and performing worship,
sacramental, and sacerdotal functions." Carl H. Esbeck, The EstablishmentClauseas a Structural
Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REv. 1, 13 n.47 (1998) (including parachurch
organizations within the meaning of the Greek word ekklesia as used in that article and defined in
the footnote).
84. Hadden, supra note 18. See also WILMERETAL., supra note 17, at 21-25 ("An essential
part of the definition of the parachurch is that it is separate from the traditional church.").
85. Churches might own or operate organizations that look like parachurch organizations.
See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987). But, as this Article defines them, those organizations are parachurch
organizations and their status under Title VII is settled. See id.
86. See McCarthy & Castelli, supra note 17, at 13 (discussing the organizational structure
of religion-sponsored social services). McCarthy and Castelli break religion-based social service
providers into three broad categories: congregations, national networks, and freestanding religious
organizations. Id.First, congregations are "local community-based groups organized around regular
religious worship." Id. Second, national networks are "denominations and their social service arms
such as Catholic Charities USA." Id.These organizations would not be parachurch organizations
as defined in this Article. National networks are also "networks of related organizations such as the
YMCA." Id.Inasmuch as national networks are independently organized, they could qualify as
parachurch organizations as defined in this Article. Third, freestanding religious organizations are
very much like parachurch organizations as parachurch organization is defined in this Article.
McCarthy and Castelli define freestanding religious organization as "organizations which are
incorporated separately from congregations and national networks, but have a religious basis."
McCarthy & Castelli, supra note 17, at 13.
87. Id.
88. Esbeck implicitly recognizes the independent character ofparachurch organizations when
he states that some "[n]onprofit organizations that are "pervasively sectarian" as that term is defined
by the Supreme Court ...may be an integral part of a church, be separately incorporated but
affiliated with a church, or be a parachurch organization that nevertheless is fully identified with
a particular faith perspective..." Esbeck, supra note 20, at 348.
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The second key 9 characteristic of parachurch organizations is their
religiosity.90 Although the secular activities of traditional churches may
qualify for the 702 exemption,9 parachurch organizations, inasmuch as
they are freestanding92 or independent, must independently demonstrate a
meaningful religious character.93
The tough question is: What exactly does it mean to have a religious
character? This question, after all, is precisely the question in much of the
litigation over whether particular organizations qualify for the 702
exemption. To evaluate the religious character of an organization claiming
the 702 exemption, courts often look for specific religious elements or
qualities as evidence of a religious character.94 Courts have observed, for
example, such specific facts as a "chapel no longer [being] used for
' the absence of religious symbols,96 whether religious
religious services,"95
teaching is normative or merely comparative, 97 affiliation with other

89. See, e.g., LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, No. Civ.A.04-430, 2004 WL
2931268, 41-42 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2004). If parachurch organizations were not religious, they
presumably would have no interest in hiring co-religionists.
90. One observer characterizes not-for-profit as an explicit requirement of a parachurch
organization. See WILLMER ET AL., supra note 17, at 17. But see Pacific Hills Treatment Centers,
Inc., http://www.pachills.com/ABOUT.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2006) (organized as for-profit
corporation although it offers both Christian and its traditional 12 step based recovery programs).
91. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 329-331 (1987) (holding that application of the 702 exemption to the "secular
nonprofit activities of religious organizations" does not violate the Establishment Clause).
92. The author acknowledges McCarthy & Castelli for use of this term in this context. See
McCarthy & Castelli, supra note 17, at 13.
93. See, e.g., EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 619 (9th Cir. 1988).
94. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir.
1993) ("The ownership and affiliation, purpose, faculty, student body, student activities, and
curriculum of the Schools are either essentially secular, or neutral as far as religion is concerned,
and we conclude the general picture of the Schools reflects a primarily secular rather than a
primarily religious orientation.") (citation omitted); LeBoon, 2005 WL 387642, at *3
("[C]onsidering the balance of secular and Jewish factors, I ... conclude that ...

the [Jewish

Community Center] is primarily a religious institution.").
95. Fike v. United Methodist Children's Home of Va., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 286,289 (E.D. Va.
1982).
96. Id.at 289 ("Aside from a painting of the Bishop in the administration building, there are
no religious symbols whatsoever in the cottages or anywhere else on the campus.").
97. Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 462,462-63 (noting that "religious studies" at the schools are
"largely comparative" and that "the purpose and emphasis of the Schools have shifted over the
years from providing religious instruction to equipping students with ethical principles that will
enable them to make their own moral judgments"); Fike, 547 F. Supp. at 289-90 (stating that
"instruction in theology as is conducted by the chaplain involves various perspectives and concepts,
including without any normative teaching, atheism").
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religious organizations," sources of funding,99 self-descriptive literature'
and mission statements, 10' a state of faith,' a personnel manual0 3 or
° and general religious tenor.'0 5 Parachurch organizations with
handbook,'O
ample religious qualities are more likely to successfully invoke the 702
exemption. 06
'

98. Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 461 ("No religious organization has ever controlled or
supported the Schools, and the Schools are not affiliated with any denomination of Protestants or
with any organization or association of religious schools."); Wirth v. College of the Ozarks, 26 F.
Supp. 2d 1185, 1187 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (noting that the "college is a member of the coalition for
Christian Colleges and Universities, a national organization of evangelical Christian institutions,
and a member of the Association of Presbyterian Colleges and Universities"); Fike, 547 F. Supp.
at 289-90 (noting that trustees had to be "confirmed by the Virginia Methodist Annual Conference"
and "in good standing of the Methodist Church" but holding that "a board of trustees who are
members of a church" is insufficient, by itself, "[f]or an organization to be considered 'religious"').
99. Killingerv. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 199 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (stating that the "largest
single source of funding" for the university came from the Alabama Baptist State Convention);
LeBoon, 2004 WL 2931268, at *4 (stating, incorrectly - as noted on reconsideration - that a
majority of funding for the Jewish Community Center "during the relevant period" came from the
"Lancaster Jewish Federation campaign"), reconsideredin LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr.
Ass'n, No. Civ.A.04-430, 2005 WL 387642 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2005) (finding that 75-85% of
funding - not $75,000 to $85,000 - came from the Lancaster Jewish Federation campaign).
100. Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 462 (noting evidence of progressive secularization from a 1955
School Survey Report to a 1961 Introductory Pamphlet to the 1989-90 Course Catalog); Fike, 547
F. Supp. at 289-90 (giving little weight to the home's "statement of church relatedness" that
purported to "pronounce officially its ties with the Church").
101. LeBoon, 2004 WL 2931268, at *4 (quoting from the mission statement and noting that
it was "printed on the cover of [the Jewish Community Center's] report on its 1998 Annual
Meeting, and [was] reportedly 'emblazoned' on the walls of the [Jewish Community Center's]
lobby"); Wirth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (quoting from the college's charter mission).
102. Killinger, 113 F.3d at 199 (stating that all faculty teaching religious courses at the
university had to "subscribe to the 1963 Baptist Statement of Faith and Message, which contains
various 'affirmations' and 'commitments' to advancing Christianity").
103. EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 1992)
(noting that the personnel manual was revised to require employees "to be a member of a Christian
church or to 'espouse during working hours no other religious preference... than the Christian
faith"').
104. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 946 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that the employee handbook
contained a statement that just cause for firing of teachers included entering into a marriage not
recognized by the Catholic Church).
105. For instance, the Kamehameha court noted the following religious qualities: "Some
official school activities have religious overtones. Teachers in kindergarten through eighth grade
lead their classes in a daily prayer, and all boarders say grace before dinner. Athletic teams pray
before games, and the School's daily bulletin usually reprints a Bible verse." Kamehameha, 990
F.2d at 462 (holding that defendant organization did not qualify for the 702 exemption).
106. See id. at 463,464 (concluding that the defendant organization's "purpose and character
is primarily secular, not primarily religious" where "the religious characteristics of the Schools
consist of minimal, largely comparative religious studies, scheduled prayers and services, quotation
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These considerations suggest this working definition of "parachurch
organization":
A parachurch organization is an independent and nonprofit
organization that is religious, as evidenced by substantial religious
qualities, and is not a church or owned or operated by or affiliated
with a church.
With this definition in hand, the next step is to analyze the 702 exemption.
III. THE 702 EXEMPTION

The Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)1 7 prohibits religionbased discrimination in private employment.' The prohibition of religionbased discrimination reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer[:]
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or

of Bible verses in a school publication, and the employment of nominally Protestant teachers for
secular subjects").
107. The relevant parts of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are codified at title 42 of the U.S. Code,
section 2000e. The law is often referred to as Title VII because it comes from Title VII of the
original public law. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, July 2, 1964,78 Stat.
241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2005)). In the same way, what is referred
to in this Article as the 702 exemption is found specifically in section 702 of Title VII of the
original public law. Thus, courts and commentators sometimes refer to it as the "702 exemption"
or "§ 702." This Article refers to the exemption as the 702 exemption.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (as amended) (West 2005). The prohibition reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer[:]
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a).
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(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.'19
The effect of the statute is to "prohibit[] employers from using an
individual's religion as a criterion for discharging or refusing to hire.""'
including the 702
Title VII contains various exemptions,'
exemption." 2 The 702 exemption reads:
(a) Inapplicability of [the Title VII prohibition of religious
discrimination] to... employees of religious entities.
This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work

109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (West 2004).
110. Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, 186 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
111. The bona fide occupational qualification exemption reads:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment
any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or
refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the
basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise ....
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e)(1) (West 2005). The religious educational institution, or "owned or operated
by," exemption, reads:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university,
or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ
employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other
educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part,
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a
particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of
such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of
learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e)(2) (West 2005).
112. See supra note 107 (explaining why the exemption is called the 702 exemption).
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connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.'13
The scope of the 702 exemption is, for the most, well-established in law.
First, the 702 exemption covers only religion-based discrimination.
Discrimination based on sex, race, color, or national origin is not
exempted. In an early opinion discussing the 702 exemption, one circuit
court wrote, "The language and the legislative history of [the 702
exemption] compel the conclusion that Congress did not intend that a
religious organization be exempted from liability for discriminating against
its employees on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin. ...
"" I
subsequent decisions, courts have affirmed and reaffirmed that the 702
exemption includes only religion-based discrimination." 5
Second, the 702 exemption covers much more than just religious
activity. As originally enacted, the scope of the 702 exemption was
narrower than its current form. From 1964 until 1972, the 702 exemption
extended only to the "religious activities" of religious organizations. 16 In

113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (West 2005).
114. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added). The
McClure court applied the 702 exemption as originally enacted. Id.at 555 n.4. But the 1972
amendment left unchanged that the 702 exemption exempted only religion-based discrimination.
115. See EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (Christian school
found liable under title VII for providing health insurance benefits only to "head of household"
employees, by which school meant only single persons and married men based upon school's
interpretation of the Bible); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982)
(religious publishing house found liable under title VII for denying female employee monetary
allowances paid to similarly situated male employees); EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir.
1980) (Baptist college not liable where it hired a male over a female because, in part, male was
Baptist); Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. I11.
1992) (exemption
does not cover discrimination based on sex or national origin); Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483
F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (where Roman Catholic high school fired pregnant female employee
for violating moral code that prohibited employees from engaging in premarital sex, court denied
summary motion, holding that while imposition of moral code was permitted under the 702
exemption, nevertheless an issue of material fact existed as to whether moral code was equally
applied to male and female employees); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists,
401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (church was not exempt from liability under title VII when it
fired a typist-receptionist for keeping a social relationship with a black man); H.R. CONF. REP.,
CONG. REC., at 7564 (Mar. 8, 1972) ("Such organizations remain subject to the provisions of Title
VII with regard to race, color, sex, or national origin").
116. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,255 (1964). The statute read:
"This title [Title VII - Equal Employment Opportunity] shall not apply ... to a religious
corporation, association, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, or society
of its religious activities .
Id.(emphasis added). Why the exemption in the first place?
According to one court:
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1972, however, Congress amended the 702 exemption." 7 Missing from the
amended statute was the "religious activities" requirement.'" Whereas the
original exemption applied to the "religious activities""' 9 of religious
employers, the amended exemption applied to the "activities"' 20 of a
religious employer. This change suggests that
2 the 1972 amendment greatly
expanded the scope of the 702 exemption.' '
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this reading of the 1972 amendment
in the landmark Amos case.' 22 The Amos Court ruled that the 702
exemption was constitutional as applied to the secular nonprofit activity of
a church. 23 The secular nonprofit activity in question was a churchoperated gymnasium that was open to the public.' When the church fired
25
a gymnasium employee for failing to qualify for a temple recommend,

[The Title VII prohibition against religion-based discrimination] posed a sharp
question under the Establishment Clause . . . as to whether Congress could
properly regulate the employment practices ... of religious organizations in
matters related to their religious activities. As a result, the original Title VII
contained an exemption from the operation of Title VII's proscriptions with
respect to the employment of co-religionists to perform work related to the
employer's religious activity.
Feldstein v. Christian Sci. Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D. Mass. 1983) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
117. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 104
(1972). The amending statute read:
Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... is amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 702. This title shall not apply... to a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals
of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities."
Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, at 255 (emphasis added).
120. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, 104 (emphasis added).
121. This study is not, strictly speaking, a study in legislative history. Rather, it is a study in
the history of legislation. These are distinct studies. The history of legislation inquiry asks only
what Congress has done. The legislative history inquiry asks why Congress did it. Both inquiries
are relevant to the purposivist interpretational method. Of the two, however, only the first inquiry
- history of legislation - is relevant to the textualist. See infra text accompanying notes 286-300
(discussing the Ninth Circuit's use of legislative history in interpreting the 702 exemption).
122. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987).
123. Id. at 330.
124. Id.
125. "Temple recommends are issued only to individuals who observe the Church's standards
in such matters as regular church attendance, tithing, and abstinence from coffee, tea, alcohol, and
tobacco." Id. at 330 n.4.
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the employee responded by suing the church for Title VII religious
discrimination. 26 The Supreme Court held that the 702 exemption
permitted the church to fire the employee for religious reasons, even
though the employee worked in a secular capacity in a secular activity of
the church.'27 As the result of Amos shows, the 702 exemption covers
practically all nonprofit 2 activity of a qualifying religious employer.
Third, at least one federal circuit court has clarified that the 702
exemption permits both hiring and firing on the basis of religion. 29 The
court stated, "[I]t is clear that religious discrimination claims are barred
with respect to the entire realm of the employment arena and not just the
actual hiring of individuals."' 30
Fourth, the 702 exemption may allow religious employers to require
religious conformity in employees' lifestyles, notjust employees' religious
affiliation or beliefs. In Little v. Wuerl,'3 ' a Protestant teacher worked for
a parish-operated Roman Catholic school. 32
1 When the teacher divorced her
husband and subsequently remarried a Catholic without annulling her first
marriage, the school did not renew the teacher's contract. 33 The teacher
sued the church for Title VII religious discrimination, and the church
claimed the 702 exemption.'34
The church in Little qualified for the 702 exemption. The question was
not only whether the 702 exemption permitted the church to require its
employees to be affiliated with the church's religion, but also whether the
702 exemption permitted the church to require its employees to conform
their lifestyles to the tenets of the church's religion. In this particular case,
the lifestyle issue was divorce. 13' After examining the legislative history,

126. Id.at 331.
127. Amos, 483 U.S. at 338.
128. Technically, the holding was even broader because the Amos court did not explicitly
distinguish between for-profit and nonprofit church activities, but, rather, between secular and
religious church activities. Justice O'Connor noted this in her concurring opinion: "[T]he question
of the constitutionality of the ...702 exemption as applied to for-profit activities of religious
organizations remains open." Id. at 349 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
129. See Hopkins v. Women's Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 238 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
130. Id. at 180 (emphasis added). See also Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d
618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991)). But see Jane
Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Casefor Applying Employment
Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1107 (1996) (arguing that
"[d]ischarge cases pose less threat [of state intrusion] to religion than hiring cases").
131. Little, 929 F.2d at 944.
132. Id.at 945.
133. Id.at 946.
134. Id.
135. Id.A church official said: "I consider [the plaintiff's] action in publicly rejecting the
doctrine and laws of the Church by marrying a Catholic without proper validation to be a serious

2006]
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the court found the Title VU prohibition of religion-based discrimination
did not apply to the church because the church qualified for the 702
exemption. ' The Little court held, "the permission to employ persons 'of
a particular religion' includes permission to employ only persons whose
beliefs and conduct are consistent with the employer's religious
precepts." '3 7 Although the opinion in Little was designed to avoid a
constitutional conflict, 38 the holding nevertheless recognizes that religious
employers often have as much, or more, interest in the religious conformity
of their employees' lifestyles as in their employees' religious affiliation or
beliefs.
Fifth, religious employers do not waive the 702 exemption by hiring
employees that are not affiliated with the employer's religion. 3 9 The Little
court explicitly stated the 702 exemption could not be waived. 4 ' Because
waiving the 702 exemption would "expand the statute's scope" by
applying Title VII to organizations to which Title VII should not be
applied, the 702 exemption cannot be waived.' 4 '
This may mean that religious employers do not have to inquire about
an employee's religion during the hiring process. In Presbyterian
Ministries,'42 the federal district court permitted a Christian retirement
home to exercise the 702 exemption even though the retirement home had
not investigated the plaintiff-employee's religious beliefs during the hiring
process. 43 The plaintiff, a receptionist at the retirement home, sued for
Title VII religious discrimination when the retirement home discharged her
for wearing the headcovering "she was required to wear as a Muslim.""'
The plaintiff argued, similarly to the plaintiff in Little, that the retirement
home should not be able to claim the 702 exemption because the
retirement home "did not limit employees to co-religionists, i.e.,
Christians. '4 5 The court replied that "[m]erely because [the nursing home]

contradiction of the Church's teachings and laws on the indissolubility of Christian marriage and
the sacramental nature of the marriage bond." Id.
136. The court stated, "We are... persuaded that Congress intended the explicit exemptions
to Title VII to enable religious organizations to create and maintain communities ... faithful to
their doctrinal practices .... Little, 929 F.2d at 951.
137. Id.
138. The circuit court recognized that applying Title VII to the church in this context would
raise serious constitutional issues. Id. at 949.
139. Id.
140. "Once Congress stated that '[t]his title shall not apply' to religiously-motivated
employment decisions by religious organizations, no act by [the plaintiff] or the [church] could
expand the statute's scope." Id. at 949.
141. Little, 929 F.2d at 949.
142. EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, 788 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
143. Id. at 1155, 1157-58.
144. Id. at 1155.
145. Id. Note: These are not necessarily the words of the plaintiff.
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did not actively inquire into Plaintiffs religion does not provide a
mechanism for an employee to subsequently begin to assert a non-Christian
religious belief in a manner deemed inappropriate by [the nursing
home]."'
As in Little, the PresbyterianMinistries court effectively held that
religious employers do not waive the 702 exemption merely by hiring a
non-co-religionist or failing to investigate actively the employee's religious
affiliation during the hiring process. Consequently, religious employers are
probably not required to have a "specific religious policy
" ' ' 17 that
48
establishes a "preference for a particular sect in hiring."
Finally, it is important to understand the relationship between the socalled "minister exception" and the 702 exemption. The minister exception
provides that Title VII does not apply to the employment relationship
between a minister and a church because such application would be
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.' 49 Whereas the 702
exemption is a statutory exemption from the strictures of Title VII, the
minister exception is a constitutional prohibition against applying Title VII
to a religious employer altogether.
In an early exposition of the minister exception, one federal circuit
court said, "[T]he application of . . . Title VII to the employment
relationship existing between ... a church and its ministers would result
in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious freedom which it
is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment." 50 Subsequently, the minister exception has been
applied in the Title VII context by several courts. 5 ' Although it is not
always clear who qualifies as a minister under the minister exception, the
analytical emphasis is often upon the employee's function rather than the
employee's title. 52 Ifthe minister exception applies, then courts should not

146. Id. at 156.
147. See Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 199 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that the
circuit court is aware of no authority for the view requiring religious employers to have specific
religious policy).
148. Killinger, 113 F.3d at 199.
149. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972).
150. Id. The circuit court used this language to explain why ministers were distinct from
nonministerial employees: "The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its
lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose.
Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical
concern." Id. at 558-59.
151. See, e.g., Alicea-Hemandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003);
Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir.
1999); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985);
EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
152. See, e.g., Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., 363 F.3d 299, 309 (holding
that "the position of mashgiach" - i.e., kosher food supervisor - is ministerial because the
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adjudicate Title VII discrimination claims, including
discrimination against gender, race, or national origin.'53
IV. WHO QUALIFIES FOR THE

claims of

702 EXEMPTION?

The scope of the 702 exemption is largely settled, but the question of
who qualifies for it is not. There are at least fifteen federal cases where at
issue was whether a defendant qualified for the 702 exemption.'54 In eight

"primary duties" of the position "included supervision and participation in religious ritual and
worship" and because the "position is important to the spiritual mission of Judaism"); AliceaHernandez, 320 F.3d at 704 (holding that the position of Hispanic Communications Director for
the Catholic Bishop of Chicago "served a ministerial function" because "a press secretary is
responsible for conveying the message of an organization to the public as a whole" and "is often
the primary communications link to the general populace"). Indeed, more than one court has
forthrightly stated that the test is a functional test. Id. at 703 ("In determining whether an employee
is considered a minister for the purposes of applying this exception, we do not look to ordination
but instead to the function of the position."); Rayburn, 772 F.2d. at 1168-69 (citations omitted)
(stating that the "'ministerial exception' to Title VII first articulated in McClure v. SalvationArmy,
does not depend upon ordination but upon the function of the position."). But see EEOC v. Pac.
Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that editorial-secretary was not a
minister); Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d at 277 (holding that seminary faculty were
"ministers" but support staff were not); EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that a college professor was not minister); Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D.
Iowa 1980) (high school teacher not a minister); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that a church secretary was not a minister).
153. See, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 704 (barring Title VII national origin and gender
discrimination claim due to minister exception); Combs, 173 F.3d at 343-44 (barring Title VII
gender and pregnancy discrimination claim due to minister exception); Rayburn, 772 F.2d. at 1172
(barring Title VII gender and race discrimination claim due to minister exception).
154. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327 (1987); Killinger, 196 F.3d at 196; EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Estate, 990
F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Townley Eng'g
& Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th
Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); King's Garden, Inc.
v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974); LeBoon, 2004 WL 2931268; Hopkins v. Women's Div.,
Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 238 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.D.C. 2002); Wirth v. College of the Ozarks,
26 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (W.D. Mo. 1998); EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154
(W.D. Wash. 1992); Heintzelman v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc., No. EV 87-203-C,
1989 WL 247140 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 1989); Fike v. United Methodist Children's Home ofVa., Inc.,
547 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Va. 1982); Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Ia. E.D.
1980).
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of these cases, the defendant qualified for the 702 exemption. 55 In seven
of these cases, the defendant did not qualify for the 702 exemption.' 56
A. Cases Where DefendantDid Not Qualifyfor the 702 Exemption
Of seven cases in which a defendant did not qualify for the 702
exemption, four were decided in the Ninth Circuit.5 7 A fifth case, decided
in the D.C. Circuit over thirty years ago, is confusing and largely irrelevant
because of the administrative law issues involved.' The sixth case,
decided by a federal district court in Iowa, involved sex discrimination and,
for that reason, did not trigger the 702 exemption.'59 In the seventh case,
the 702 determination was not essential to the outcome. 60 An early
assessment of the case law reveals that defendants litigating outside the
Ninth Circuit on clean facts of religion-based employment preferences
enjoy excellent odds of qualifying for the 702 exemption.
A more thorough summary of the case law shows that three of seven
cases in which defendants did not qualify for the 702 exemption involved
sex discrimination.16 1 Because the 702 exemption does not cover sex
discrimination, 162 the defendants in those cases clearly should not have
qualified for the 702 exemption. A fourth case involved a commercial
manufacturing company. 63 Because the 702 exemption is only for religious
organizations, the secular manufacturing company clearly did not qualify
for the 702 exemption even though the owners where Christians and
desired their company to be "a Christian, faith-operated business."'' "
In the fifth case, King's Garden,165 a relatively old decision, the
defendant was a radio station licensee appealing a Federal

155. Amos, 483 U.S. at 327; Killinger, 196 F.3d at 196; Little, 929 F.2d at 944; LeBoon, No.
Civ.A.04-430, 2004 WL at 2931268; Hopkins, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 174; Wirth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at
1185; PresbyterianMinistries,Inc., 788 F. Supp. at 1154; Heintzelman, No. EV 87-203-C, 1989
WL at 247140.
156. Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 460; Townley, 859 F.2d at 610; FremontChristianSch., 781
F.2d at 1362; Pac.PressPubl'gAss 'n, 676 F.2d at 1272; King's Garden,498 F.2d at 51; Fike, 547
F. Supp. at 286; Dolter, 483 F. Supp. at 266.
157. Townley, 859 F.2d at 610; FremontChristianSch., 781 F.2d at 1362; Pac. PressPubl'g
Ass'n, 676 F.2d at 1272; Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 458.
158. King's Garden, 498 F.2d at 51.
159. Dolter,483 F. Supp. at 266.
160. Fike, 547 F. Supp. at 290 (holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim of religious
discrimination).
161. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d at 1362; Pac.Press Publ'gAss'n, 676 F.2d at 1272;
Dolter,483 F. Supp. at 266.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
163. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 611 (9th Cir. 1988).
164. Id.at 611-12.
165. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Communications Commission (FCC) determination that the radio station
licensee "was discriminating on religious grounds in its employment
practices."' 66 The radio station licensee was a "non-profit,
interdenominational, religious, and charitable organization"' 67 whose
"activities include[d] a number of ministries whose basic goal is to 'share
Christ world wide'."'68 The "controversy arose when ajob applicant at one
of King's Garden's stations complained to the FCC that he was asked
questions 1such
as 'Are you a Christian?', 'Is your spouse a Christian?', and
69
like."'
the
The FCC had its own antidiscrimination regulations and exemptions for
religious employers.'70 The precise issue in King's Gardenwas whether the
FCC's religious exemption adequately conformed to the relevant statutes
and to the U.S. Constitution.' 7 ' The FCC's position was that "only 'those
persons hired to espouse a particular religious philosophy over the air
should be exempt from the non-discrimination rules."'
In contrast, the 702 exemption, as amended by Congress in 1972,
covered all "activities"
of religious organizations, not merely their
"religious activities. '17' The King's Garden court stated that the 702
exemption as amended in 1972 "is of very doubtful constitutionality, and
Congress has given absolutely no indication that it wished to impose the
exemption upon the FCC.'

constitutional issue

75

74

Thus, the circuit court sidestepped the

and held that the 702 exemption did not apply to the

166. Id. at 52.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 52 n. 1. The circuit court continued: "The Commission forwarded the complaint to
King's Garden .... King's Garden responded by claiming the statutory and constitutional right to
discriminate on religious grounds with respect to all positions of employment at its radio stations."
Id. (citations omitted).
170. King's Garden, 498 F.2d at 52.
171. The circuit court said:
The Commission ruled... that only "those persons hired to espouse a particular
religious philosophy over the air should be exempt from the non-discrimination
rules." This position was reaffirmed after enactment of the 1972 exemption to the
Civil Rights Act mentioned in text. The question in this case is whether the
Commission's qualified exemption facially conforms to relevant statutes and the
Constitution. We do not deal with application of the exemption to any particular
job position at King's Garden.
Id. at 52 n. 1.
172. Id.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
174. King's Garden, 498 F.2d at 53.
175. "A definitive resolution of the constitutional issues raised by the 1972 exemption can
therefore be deferred to a case where they are squarely raised." Id. at 57-58.
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radio station because the radio station was subject to the FCC's own rules.
The circuit court found that the FCC was "justified in finding the
[amended 702 exemption] irrelevant to its regulation"' 76 of the defendant.
Thus, the issue ofwhether the defendant in King's Garden qualified for the
702 exemption was never squarely reached.
King's Gardenwas decided in 1974. Thirteen years later, in Amos, 7 7
the U.S. Supreme Court gave a "definitive resolution of the constitutional
issues raised by the 1972 exemption.' 171 In Amos, the Court held that the
702 exemption applies even to the secular activities of religious
organizations.179 While the precise issue in King s Garden was not at issue
in Amos, the constitutionality of the 702 exemption was no longer in doubt.
Two remaining cases squarely addressed the 702 exemption. In the first
case, Fike v. UnitedMethodist Children 's Home of Virginia,"0 the district
court, on remand from the Fourth Circuit,'' held that the defendant was
not a religious organization, and thus did not qualify for the 702
exemption.8I 2 The defendant in Fike was a children's home that "was
founded by and.., had close ties with the Methodist Church."' 83 Although
the home originally accommodated children placed in the home by "private
sources through Christian auspices,"' 8 4 over time, the state placed more
children in the home, and the home adapted to accommodate a "new type
of youngster"'8 5 and the accompanying state funding. 8 6 Although the
children's home offered some evidence of its ties to the Methodist Church
and other religious indicia,1 7 countervailing evidence suggested that, by

176. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
177. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987).
178. King's Garden, 498 F.2d at 57-58.
179. Amos, 483 U.S. at 338.
180. Fike v. United Methodist Children's Home of Va., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Va.
1982).
181. The district court originally dismissed the plaintiff's Title VII religious discrimination
claim after finding no religious discrimination. Fike v. United Methodist Children's Home of Va.,
Inc., 493 F. Supp. 935, 938 (D.C. Va. 1980). But, on appeal, and in an unpublished opinion, 660
F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1981), the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, directing the district court to
determine whether the children's home was a sectarian or secular organization. Fike, 547 F. Supp.
at 287-88.
182. Fike, 547 F. Supp. at 290.
183. Id. at288.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.at 289.
187. "During plaintiff's tenure, the Board of Trustees of the Home drafted a 'statement of
church relatedness' to pronounce officially its ties with the Church. Trustees of the Home must be
confirmed by the Virginia Methodist Annual Conference. A trustee must be a member in good
standing of the Methodist Church." Fike, 547 F. Supp. at 289.
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the time of the alleged discrimination, the children's home was, "quite
literally, Methodist only in name."' 88
The children's home had tried to downplay its religiosity "for the
purpose of establishing that [it] was secular and therefore not in violation
of the establishment clause in receiving State funds."' 89 The Fike court
found the children's home to be duplicitous because it "tried to serve God
and mammon by representing to the Church its sectarian nature and
representing to the government its secular nature.""'9 The Fike court
concluded, "For an organization to be considered 'religious' requires
something more than a board of trustees who are members of a church....
[T]he United Methodist Children's Home is, quite literally, Methodist only
in name. It is a secular institution."' 9 ' Therefore, the children's home in
Fike did not qualify for the 702 exemption.
The reasoning of the Fike court provides insight into the analysis
required to determine whether an organization qualifies for the 702
exemption.'92 In Fike, the defendant children's home clearly had

188. Id. at 290. The Fike court noticed the following facts:
[The children's home] admits that the chapel is no longer used for religious
services. In fact, no religious services have been held on the campus since 1978.
Aside from a painting of the Bishop in the administration building, there are no
religious symbols whatsoever in the cottages or anywhere else on the campus.
While a Bible may be provided to any child who specifically requests it, Bibles are
not provided to each child and are not placed in each cottage; while a chaplain is
on the staff, the chaplain never engages in Bible study or prayer groups. In fact,
such instruction in theology as is conducted by the chaplain involves various
perspectives and concepts, including without any normative teaching, atheism.
Attendance at religious services is not encouraged and is purely voluntary. Indeed,
in light of the affidavits of responsible officials of the Home filed in this case, it
would appear that the incumbent chaplain is indifferent to the Christian religion.
Id. at 289-90.
189. Id. at 290 n.2.
190. Id. at290.
191. Id.
192. Because the Fike court held to its original decision that the plaintiff had "failed to state
a claim of religious discrimination," the determination as to the children's home secularity was,
ultimately, somewhat irrelevant. Fike, 547 F. Supp. at 290. The Fike court itself recognized this:
This Court understands that a determination of the secular or sectarian nature of
the Home is necessary to decide whether the Home is entitled to the religious
exemption in § 2000e-1. But the religious exemption from a charge of religious
discrimination is unnecessary if, as this Court held, plaintiff failed to state a claim
of religious discrimination. While the Fourth Circuit did not question this Court's
holding that plaintiff had failed to state such a claim, its directions to this Court
imply such questioning; otherwise, the Fourth Circuit has sent this Court on a
fool's errand. However, the Fourth Circuit opinion provided no guidance for this
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abandoned whatever religious character it originally had.'93 Further, the
children's home apparently was willing to sacrifice its religious emphasis
in exchange for State funds.'9 4 Writing a "statement of church
relatedness"' 95 and requiring trustees to be members "in good standing of
the Methodist Church"'9 6 simply were not enough to qualify the children's
home for the 702 exemption."'
For largely the same reasons, the Ninth Circuit reached the same result
under similar facts in EEOC v. Kamehameha/Bishop Estate.9 8 In
Kamehameha, the defendants were two schools that had a policy of hiring
only Protestant teachers. 99 The policy was dictated by the terms of the
Bishop estate, which had established the schools. 20 According to those
terms, "[T]eachers of said schools shall forever be persons of the Protestant
religion." Both schools eventually were sued for religious discrimination
when one of the schools did not hire ajob applicant because the applicant
was not Protestant.20 2 In their defense, the schools claimed the 702
exemption. 203
The Kamehameha court began its analysis of the 702 exemption by
stating it would "construe the statutory exemptions narrowly. ' 2 4 The
circuit court then found that "[n]o religious organization has ever
controlled or supported the Schools, and the Schools are not affiliated with
any denomination of Protestants or with any organization or association of
religious schools. 20 5 The circuit court also found that "[t]he Schools are
a part of the Bishop Trust, which is a large and overwhelmingly secular
business. "206 According to the circuit court, the schools' "purpose and
emphasis . . . have shifted over the years from providing religious

Court on the discrimination claim and indicated no errors in the law or the logic
relied on by this Court.
Id. at 288 n. 1.
193. In the words of the court, "as far as the direction given the day-to-day life for the children
at the [children's home] is concerned, it is practically devoid of religious content or training, as
such." Id.at 290.
194. Id. at 289-90.
195. Id. at 289.
196. Id.
197. Fike, 547 F. Supp. at 289.
198. EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993).
199. Id. at 459.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 459.
204. Id. at 460.
205. Id. at461.
206. Id.
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instruction to equipping students with ethical principles that will enable
them to make their own moral judgments."2 7 The circuit court also found
that the schools "have explicitly disavowed any effort to convert nonProtestant students.""2 8 Even though the schools demonstrated some
religious character,20 9 the court ultimately concluded that "the general
picture of the Schools reflects a primarily secular rather than a primarily
religious orientation."210 The schools in Kamehameha did not qualify for
the 702 exemption.2
The Kamehameha court concluded that the schools were primarily a
secular organization.2 2 The Kamehameha Schools apparently imposed the
Protestant requirement not out of any "desire to create communities
faithful to their religious principles, 23 but rather to comply with the terms
of the trust.214 The schools were not affiliated with any church or other
religious organization, and therefore were forced to satisfy independently
the requirements of the 702 exemption. 215 Because "the general picture of
the [s]chools reflect[ed] a primarily secular rather than a primarily religious
orientation, 2 a the circuit court refused to extend the 702 exemption to the
schools. 217 The schools failed to show genuine religious motive and

207. Id. at 462.
208. Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 463.
209. The court explained:
Student activities include daily prayer in grades kindergarten through eight;
athletic teams pray before games; daily bulletin includes a Bible verse; boarding
students pray before meals and attend church weekly; students go to other islands
to lead services; many mandatory school functions include prayer and hymns in
addition to celebrations of Hawaiian culture.
Id. at 462-63.
210. Id. at 461.
211. Id. at 463-64. The court subsequently also refused to qualify the schools under the
703(e)(1) and 703(e)(2) exemptions. Id. at 464-65.
212. Id. at 463-64.
213. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 950 (3d Cir. 1991).
214. It seemed as if the trust which had established the schools continued to maintain the
schools financially, although the circuit court did not explicitly say so.
215. The circuit court emphasized the schools' independence from any church: "[W]here the
school is not owned by a church, the courts must determine in each case whether a particular
educational institution is a religious organization." Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 460 n.5. "In view of
the narrow reach of the [702] exemption, it is not surprising that we have found no case holding the
exemption to be applicable where the institution was not wholly or partially owned by a church."
Id. at 461 n.7.
216. Id. at461.
217. Id.
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character; the religious preference dictated by the estate that had
established the schools was not enough.2"'
A summary of seven cases in which defendants did not qualify for the
702 exemption goes like this. Three of the cases involved sex
discrimination. 2 9' Because the 702 exemption does not include sex
discrimination, those organizations did not qualify for the 702 exemption.
One case involved a for-profit commercial manufacturing company.22 °
Because the 702 exemption includes only religious organizations, that
organization did not qualify for the exemption. Two cases involved
organizations that had devolved into or were primarily secular entities.22 '
Because the 702 exemption includes only religious organizations, those
organizations did not qualify for the 702 exemption. Finally, King's
Garden,222 a pre-Amos ruling involving an issue of administrative law, has
little bearing on the analysis in this Article. For the most part, defendants
that did not qualify for the 702 exemption clearly should not have qualified
for the 702 exemption.
B. Cases Where Defendant Qualifiedfor the 702 Exemption
In at least eight cases, defendants have qualified for the 702
22 In these cases, the defending organizations have included a
exemption. 221
nonprofit gymnasium open to the public and operated by religious entities
associated with the Church of Jesus Christ and Latter-Day Saints, 224 a
Baptist university,22 a parish-operated Roman Catholic school, 226 a Jewish

218. "The fact that the Protestant-only requirement appears in Mrs. Bishop's will cannot in
itself alter the result." Id.at 466. This conclusion by the circuit court was made in the context of
holding that the Protestant-only requirement was not a bona fide occupational qualification but it
nevertheless also sheds light on the 702 exemption context. Id. at 466-67.
219. EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Pac. Press
Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D.
Ia.E.D. 1980).
220. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 611 (9th Cir. 1988).
221. Fike v. United Methodist Children's Home of Va., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 286,290 (E.D. Va.
1982); EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1993).
222. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
223. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327 (1987); Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196 (11 th Cir. 1997); Little, 929 F.2d
at 944; LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, No. Civ.A.04-430, 2004 WL 2931268 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 16,2004); Hopkins v. Women's Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 238 F. Supp. 2d 174
(D.D.C. 2002); Wirth v. Coll. of the Ozarks, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (W.D. Mo. 1998); EEOC v.
Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Heintzelman v. St. Mary's
Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc., No. EV 87-203-C, 1989 WL 247140 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 1989).
224. Amos, 483 U.S. at 330. It was not contested that the operating organizations were
"religious organizations for purposes of § 702." Id.at 330 n.3.
225. Killinger, 196 F.3d at 199.
226. Little, 929 F.2d at 945.
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community center, 22 an affiliated auxiliary of the United Methodist

Church, 22 8 a nondenominational Christian college, 229 a retirement home

operated by a Presbyterian church, 23 ° and a medical center affiliated with
and operated by a religious order of the Roman Catholic Church.23 '
In these eight cases, one immediately notices that most of the
organizations that qualified for the 702 exemption were either a church or
affiliated with a church.23 2 Because churches and church-operated activities
clearly qualify for the 702 exemption, this observation is not surprising.233
The three remaining cases require further analysis. Two of the cases
a Baptist university and a
involved educational institutions These
cases shed little light on the
college.
Christian
nondenominational
702 exemption explicitly
the
because
Article
in
this
question posed
2
34
The third case, however,
institutions.
religious
educational
includes
argues that this Jewish
Article
Center.
This
Jewish
Community
a
involved
in federal law to
organization
parachurch
first
is
the
Center
Community
exemption.
the
702
qualify for

227. LeBoon, 2004 WL 2931268, at *l.
228. Hopkins, 238 F.2d at 176. Defendant United Methodist Women was an auxiliary to the
Women's Division of the General Board of Global Ministries of the General Conference of the
United Methodist Church. Id. at 176.
229. Wirth v. Coll. of the Ozarks, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1187-88 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
230. EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 1992). The
court stated that the nursing home was operated by Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., though it was not
clear whether they were affiliated with the Presbyterian Church. But, in its summary of the facts,
the court states that the plaintiff was informed that the retirement home "is operated as a Christian
retirement home by the Presbyterian Church." Id. Treatment of the case in this article is based on
this language.
231. Heintzelman v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc., No. EV 87-203-C, 1989 WL
247140, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 1989).
232. In PresbyterianMinistries, it is unclear whether the retirement home was owned by a
church. The court applied the 702 exemption to Exeter House, "a retirement home [] operated by
Presbyterian Ministries, Inc." PresbyterianMinistries, 788 F. Supp. at 1155. The court does not
directly say who owned the home. But, the court does say this: "It was explained to Plaintiff that
Exeter House is operated as a Christian retirement home by the Presbyterian Church...."Id. This
language seems to indicate that Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. may itself have been owned by or
affiliated with the Presbyterian Church. For purposes of this Article, then, the retirement home was
effectively owned by a church.
233. In 1993, the Kamehameha court recognized this same thing: "In view of the narrow reach
of the (702] exemption, it is not surprising that we have found no case holding the exemption to
be applicable where the institution was not wholly or partially owned by a church." EEOC v.
Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 461 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993).
234. "This title shall not apply.., to a[n] ... educational institution... with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on
by such ... educational institution... of its activities." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1 (West 2005).
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1. Religious Educational Institutions Qualify for the 702 Exemption
The educational institution cases mentioned above involved a Baptist
university and a nondenominational Christian college. In Killinger v.
Samford University,235 the court declared that the defendant university was
"doubtlessly a 'religious educational institution'."236 In support of this
conclusion, the Killinger court recounted extensive evidence of the
university's religious character. 237 First, the court analyzed the relationship
between the university and its founding organization, the Alabama Baptist
State Convention. Although "[the university had] amended its charter to
remove the Convention's power to elect the school's trustees," 238 the court
noted that the university "receives roughly seven percent of its annual
budget (over four million dollars) from the Convention. 23 ' The court also
noted that the university "reports financially to ... the Convention. '"24 °
Thus, while it was unclear whether the Alabama Baptist State Convention
"owned" or "operated" the university, there were clearly strong financial
ties between the Convention and the university.
In addition to emphasizing the university's ties with the Alabama
Baptist State Convention, the Killinger court also examined the religious
qualities of the university itself.24 ' The circuit court noted the university's
charter designated its chief purpose as "the promotion of the Christian
Religion throughout the world by maintaining and operating . . .
institutions dedicated to the development of Christian character in high
scholastic standing., 24 2 Faculty members who taught religion courses at
Samford had to subscribe to a statement of Christian faith,2 43 and "all
students [were] required to attend chapel." 2 " Overall, the circuit court
rejected the notion that "some kind of rigid sectarianism is a requirement
for the [702] exemption"2 45 and held that the university was "doubtlessly
a 'religious educational institution. ' '2 6

235. 113 F.3d 196 (1lth Cir. 1997).
236. Id. at 199.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Killinger, 113 F.3d at 199.
241. In fact, because the circuit court devotes a separate section to the 703(e)(2) exemption
- providing for educational institutions that are in "whole or substantial part, owned, supported,
controlled, or managed by a particular religion," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) - it seems the circuit
court applied the 702 exemption to the University on the basis of the University's independent
religious qualities.
242. Killinger, 113 F.3d at 199.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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The same was true in the second educational institution case, Wirth v.
College of the Ozarks. 247 In applying the 702 exemption 241 to the
nondenominational Christian college in Wirth, the court cited the following
facts:
The Presbyterian Church Synod founded the College of the Ozarks
in 1906. In 1986, the college was incorporated in the state of
Missouri as a not-for-profit corporation. The charter mission of the
college is "providing Christian education for youth of both sexes,
especially those found worthy but who are without sufficient means
to procure such training." Additionally, the college is a member of
the Coalition for Christian Colleges and Universities, a national
organization of evangelical Christian institutions, and a member of
the Association of Presbyterian Colleges and Universities.249
The plaintiff in Wirth argued that the college's nondenominationalism
prevented the College from firing the plaintiff, a Roman Catholic, because
the plaintiff's "views [were] also Christian., 250 The Wirth court found this
argument to be without merit.25 ' In support of its conclusion, the Wirth
court stated, "The exemptions under Title VII... apply, by their terms, to
'religious corporations' notwithstanding the particular beliefs which the
religious corporations seek to foster. 25 The Wirth court continued, "The
[college] clearly meets the definition of a religious corporation and
therefore is not subject to Title VII... claims based upon religion., 253 The
college was, therefore, allowed to "employ only persons whose beliefs are
consistent with the views of the [college] 254 Thus, the Wirth court held
that the nondenominational Christian college could fire a Roman Catholic
employee.255
At least, Killinger and Wirth stand for the proposition that religious
universities affiliated with greater religious bodies qualify for the 702
exemption. At most, the cases stand for the proposition that religious
universities independently qualify for the 702 exemption. Either way,
Killinger and Wirth have little to say about whether parachurch

247. Wirth v. Coll. of the Ozarks, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
248. The Wirth court also applied the 703(e)(2) exemption. Wirth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1188. The
Missouri Human Rights Act was also at issue. Id.
249. Id. at 1187. It is unclear whether the Presbyterian Church Synod continued to "own" or
"operate" the College.
250. Id. at 1188.

251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Wirth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1188.
254. Id.

255. Id.
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organizations qualify for the 702 exemption because most parachurch
organizations are not religious colleges or universities.
2. LeBoon - A Prototypical Parachurch Case
LeBoon v. LancasterJewish Community CenterAssociation2.. arguably
is
the first federal case in which a parachurch organization successfully
qualified for the 702 exemption. 58 The defendant in LeBoon was a Jewish
Community Center, characterized as "a nonprofit Jewish organization."259
The plaintiff employee, a business manager,26 ° was an evangelical
Christian. 26 ' The employee alleged she was fired for religious reasons after
the Jewish Community Center discovered she had attended a "Jews For
Jesus" concert at her church.2 62 The LeBoon court held that the Jewish
Community Center qualified for the 702 exemption and therefore could
fire the plaintiff for religious reasons.263
The Jewish Community Center in LeBoon is a good example of a
parachurch organization. Unlike the defendants in most other 702
exemption cases, the Jewish Community Center was not a traditional
religious organization, nor was it affiliated with a traditional religious
organization. The court found that the Jewish Community Center was "not
run by, and [was] not directly answerable to... any one synagogue or
denomination of Judaism."2 The Jewish Community Center was both
religious and independent. This is precisely the definition of a parachurch
organization as proposed and illustrated in this Article.265
In conducting its analysis of whether the Jewish Community Center
was primarily religious, the LeBoon court noted the following factors.
257

256. LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, No. Civ.A.04-430, 2004 WL 2931268,
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 16,2004), reconsideredin LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, No. Civ.A.
04-430, 2005 WL 387642 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2005).
257. It depends how you define parachurch organization. Based on the definition,
understanding, and illustration of parachurch organization in this Article, the assertion in this
statement seems to hold true.
258. The children's home in Fike, and the schools in Kamehameha, are something like
parachurch organizations, in some sense. That is, both defendant organizations provided some
indicia of religiousness, and both defendant organizations were relatively independent of other
religious institutions.
259. LeBoon, 2004 WL 2931268, at *1.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at *2. The LeBoon court decided the case on motion for summary judgment and
therefore construed the facts in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at *3 ("When ruling on a summary
judgment motion, the court must construe the evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from
it in favor of the non-moving party.").
263. Id. at *3.
264. LeBoon, 2004 WL 2931263, at *4.
265. See supra Part III.
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First, the LeBoon court noted the strong link between the Jewish
from
Community Center and the surrounding Jewish community.
S Rabbis
266
local synagogues had served on the center's board of directors. Second,
documents prepared by the Jewish Community Center suggested it
specifically served the Jewish community.267 The LeBoon court cited the
center's mission statement, which stated that the Jewish Community
Center sought to "develop, involve and sustain a cohesive Jewish
Community through Identity, Education and Cooperation for all Ages. 268
The LeBoon court also noted that the center engaged in primarily Jewish
activities and customs. 2 69 Third, in addition to considering the Jewish
Community Center's mission statement and activities, the LeBoon court
also examined notes from board meetings as evidence of the community
center's religiosity. As the LeBoon court put it, "Notes of board meetings
also reveal a pervasive Jewish orientation., 271 Whether or not board
meeting notes are the best available evidence of religiosity, the important
aspect of the LeBoon court's analysis is the finding that the Jewish

266. Id.
267. Id.
268. LeBoon, 2005 WL 387642, at *3 (citation omitted).
269. These activities included "the celebration of Jewish holidays such as Purim and
Chanukah, the attachment to each door in the building of a kosher mezuzah, the maintenance of a
kosher kitchen, the holding of a 'Melavah Malka' program, and numerous education programs on
Jewish themes." Id.
270. Id.
Aside from planning the Jewish activities described above, the board members
discussed other events specifically of interest to Jews, such as a community trip
to Israel, and a Jewish Federation program about Jews in the former Soviet Union.
Concepts of relevance only to Jews were also employed, such as using Hebrew
terms to refer to donors, and asking for donations in the amount of $613, where
613 is a number of Jewish significance.
... [The community center's] membership drive talking points, as set forth in
its ... board meeting notes, reflected its concept of itself as a specifically Jewish
organization. For example, one point was that "The LJCC is the best point of
positive contact between all segments of the Lancaster Jewish community." Other
points included: "The Center produces Jewish education and cultural
programming for the whole community[,J" "The LJCC is a meeting ground for our
own Jewish youth[,]" "The 12CC is the first point of contact for Jews new to the
area[,]"... The Center is the place for Jewish seniors to meet[,]" and "The LJCC
is the community connection to Israel."
Id. (emphasis added).
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2 7' and a "concept
Community Center had a "pervasive Jewish orientation"
2 72
organization.
Jewish
specifically
of itself as a
Weighing these types of religious characteristics requires a qualitative
analysis 71 that, as opposed to a more rigid focus on legal structure or
sources of funding, is more274appropriate in 702 exemption cases due to the

statute's general language.

Evangelical Christians, while sympathizing with the fired employee in
LeBoon, should recognize the holding as a vindication of an important
religious liberty: the right of religious employers to require religious
conformity in their employees' beliefs and lifestyles.2 7 Courts have
protected this right as to traditional religious organizations and their
affiliates. 276 Likewise, courts should now follow LeBoon by applying the
702 exemption to parachurch organizations.
V. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE

702 EXEMPTION

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted a less expansive
view of the 702 exemption than perhaps some other circuits.277 In four
cases involving a defendant who invoked the 702 exemption, the Ninth
Circuit refused to apply the exemption in each case. 27' There may be a
correlation between the outcomes in these cases and the methodology used
by the court in interpreting the 702 exemption. In three of the four cases in
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. In its original opinion granting the LJCC's motion for summary judgment, the LeBoon
court gave greater weight to the community center's sources of funding. See supra note 99.
274. For a discussion of methodologies for interpreting the 702 exemption, see supra text
accompanying notes 113-53.
275. One observer of evangelical Christianity was quick to discern precisely this point. See Ted
Olsen, Weblog: Bad News for Fired Christian is Good News for Christian Organizations,
CHRISTLANITY TODAY, Dec. 21, 2004, http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2004/151/21.0.html.
276. Corp. ofthe Presiding Bishop ofthe Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 330-40 (1987).
277. The trial court in Kamehameha stated this explicitly in vacating, on remand from the
Ninth Circuit, its previous order granting the Kamehameha Schools motion for summary judgment
on grounds that the Schools qualified for the 702 exemption. According to the District Court for
the District of Hawaii, "In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit panel (Judges Browning, Norris,
and Reinhardt) ruled that the [702 exemption] must be construed narrowly; whereas all other
Circuit Courts which have considered the issue have held that [the 702 exemption] should be
construed broadly." EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Estate, 848 F. Supp. 899, 899-900 (D.
Haw. 1993). The Kamehameha court also noted that the "U.S. Supreme Court declined to consider
this conflict between the circuits." Id.
278. EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993); EEOC v.
Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781
F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
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which the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the 702 exemption to the
defendant employer, the court looked to legislative history to support its
interpretation of Title VII and the 702 exemption. 279 This strategy is best
illustrated by the Townley case.28
In Townley, the court refused to extend the 702 exemption to the
Christian owners of a manufacturing company that required its employees
to attend a weekly devotional service during work hours. 281' Employees
were paid for the time they spent at the devotional services.282 When an
employee sued the manufacturing company for religious discrimination,
the defendants argued that because the company was a religious
corporation for the purposes of the 702 exemption, the defendants could
require employees to attend weekly devotional services.283
According to the defendants, the weekly devotional services were just
one way the defendants sought to honor their "covenant with God that their
business 'would be a Christian, faith-operated business.' 284 In addition to
holding devotional services, the defendants also put a Gospel tract in each
piece of outgoing mail, printed Bible verses on company documents, and
gave money to various churches and missionaries.2 Faced with these
facts, the Ninth Circuit had to decide whether the trial court had correctly
denied the 702 exemption to the defendants.
The circuit court immediately looked to the legislative history of the
702 exemption. 286 Admitting that the available legislative history was not

279. Townley, 859 F.2d at 617-18; FremontChristianSch., 781 F.2d at 1366; Pac. Press, 676
F.2d at 1276-77.
280. Townley is the best example for two reasons. First, the Kamehameha court follows
Townley. The Kamehameha court said, "We . . . observed [in Townley] [that] 'Congress'
conception of the scope of [the 702 exemption] was not a broad one. All assumed that only those
institutions with extremely close ties to organized religion would be covered. Churches, and entities
similar to churches, were the paradigm."' Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 460 (citing Townley, 859 F.2d
at 618). This language from the opinion in Townley was developed in direct relianceon the use of
legislative history. See Townley, 859 F.2d at 617-18. Second, the Fremont ChristianSchool and
PacificPressPublishingAssociation courts used legislative history for a more limited purpose to support holdings that the 702 exemption includes only religious discrimination. Fremont
Christian Sch., 781 F.2d at 1366; Pac. Press Publ'gAss 'n, 676 F.2d at 1276-77. See supra text
accompanying notes 113-53 (discussing the scope of the 702 exemption). Therefore, the use of
legislative history in the Fremont and Pacific Press cases is not on point for the immediate issue
of who qualifies for the 702 exemption.
281. Townley, 859 F.2d at 617.
282. Id. at 612.
283. Id. at 617.
284. Id. at 612.
285. Id.
286. In less than three sentences after raising the issue of the 702 exemption, the Townley court
stated: "A brief review of the relevant legislative history is necessary." Townley, 859 F.2d at 617.
As the Townley court found:
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definitive,2 7 the Townley court nevertheless concluded that this legislative
history indicated Congress intended a narrow scope for the 702
exemption. 218 Remarkably, the Townley court drew the following
conclusion from its survey of the scant legislative history: "All assumed
that only those institutions with extremely close ties to organized religions
would be covered. Churches, and entities similar to churches, were the
paradigm., 289 This conclusion is remarkable because, on the basis of a
handful of recorded statements made by a few legislators, the Townley
court found that "all assumed" the scope of Title VII was narrow.29°

Title VII of the bill [that was the basis of much of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]
included a section [the 702 exemption] that stated the title would not apply to a
"religious corporation, association, or society." The committee report
accompanying the bill did not elaborate on the section. However, the section was
the subject of some debate in the House after Representative Purcell proposed
amending [the bill] to allow an educational institution to discriminate on the basis
of religion if the institution was wholly or partly supported or managed "by a
particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society,"
or if the institution's curriculum was "directed toward the propagation of a
particular religion."
Id.The Townley court next said:
The debate on this proposal is relevant because an issue in the debate was whether
such institutions were already protected by the "religious corporation" exemption.
The consensus was that they were not protected if they were merely "affiliated"
with a religious organization. For example, Representative Celler, the chairman
of the Judiciary Committee and one of the drafters of the bill, was asked whether
a church-supported orphanage would already be covered by the bill. He said, "If
it is a wholly church supported organization, that is, a religious corporation that
comes under [then] section 703." This coverage was considered too narrow, and
the House passed the proposed amendment.
Id.(citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
287. Id. ("[The House Bill] was amended by the Senate in 1964, and [the enacted law] was
amended.., by Congress in 1972, but the debate on the amendments sheds no more light on the
definition of religious corporations.").
288. Id. at 617-18 ("The debate over Representative Purcell's amendment... indicate[s]...
that Congress's conception of the scope of [the 702 exemption] was not a broad one.").
289. Id. at 618.
290. The Townley court's conclusion is confusing because we cannot be sure what was meant
by "all assumed." By "all assumed," the Townley court seems to have meant that "all Congress
assumed," rather than the more restrictive meaning where "all assumed" would refer only to the
legislators involved in the particular legislative debate. This broad reading is bolstered by the
immediately preceding sentence in which the Townley court refers to "Congress' conception" of
the scope of the 702 examption: "Congress' conception of the scope of the [702 exemption] was
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The holding in Townley is a narrow construction of the 702 exemption.
Although the commercial manufacturing company should not have
qualified for the 702 exemption, the Townley court's narrow interpretation
of the statute might exclude bona fide parachurch organizations from
qualifying for the 702 exemption. Recall that the cardinal feature of
parachurch organizations is independence from traditional religious
organizations. 21' Because the Townley court suggested that "only those
institutions with extremely close ties to organized religions '292 would
qualify for the 702 exemption, the Ninth Circuit's approach seems
categorically to rule out parachurch organizations.
The interpretative strategy used in Townley can be characterized as a
purposivist approach. 293 The approach is unpersuasive, at least in the
context of interpreting the 702 exemption. 294 First, as the Townley court
itself admits, the legislative history is "far from comprehensive. ' '295
Second, some wonder why the matter-of-course remarks of a handful of
legislators made over thirty years ago have any bearing on interpreting a
statute today.296

Third, it can be imprudent for courts to attribute a collective
"conception," "assumption," or "intent" to Congress because, according to
at least one legal scholar, it is impossible for Congress to have an intent.297
not a broad one. All assumed that only those institutions with extremely close ties to organized
religion would be covered." Id. at 617-18.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
292. Townley, 859 F.2d at 618.
293. A classic exposition of the purposivist methodology, as used in Townley, is found in
United States v. American Trucking Associations: "In the interpretation of statutes, the function of
the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intentof Congress;
United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (emphasis added).
294. In my discussion of the Townley court's approach to statutory interpretation, I have
benefited much from my experience in Professor Amy Coney Barrett's excellent seminar on
statutory interpretation. Of course, I alone am responsible for the views expressed in this Article.
295. Townley, 859 F.2d at 617.
296. See generallyWilliam N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: ImplicationsofPublic
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REv. 275, 288 (1988) (giving reasons for
questioning even the more recent statements of lawmakers).
297. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute's Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 547 (1983)
("legislatures comprise many members... [and therefore] do not have 'intents' or 'designs,' hidden
yet discoverable." In this way, although "[elach member may or may not have a design[,] [tihe body
as a whole.., has only outcomes."). Easterbrook, supranote 297, at 547. Easterbrook's point may
sound like common sense - at first. But as an issue of social science, group action is subject to
searching (and ancient) analysis. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL
THEORY 23-37 (1998) (discussing, in 11.2-11.4, Aquinas' social theory, which accounts for group
acts as well as individual acts). Finnis says, "There is a social act, we can say, when some proposal
for co-ordinated action is held out to relevant members of the society in such a way that they can,
and some or all do, choose to participate in the proposed action precisely as the action thus,
'publicly,' proposed." Id. at 28.
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If this is true, then it is irresponsible to impute the opinions of a few
members to the entire institution to declare an institutional "intent,"
"assumption," or "conception."298
'
Fourth, deciding cases on the basis of legislative intent implicates the
legitimacy of judicial action. According to Justice Scalia, "It is the law that
governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.""9 On this account, judges have no
business attempting to divine legislative intent. Rather, judges should
attempt to state only what the law itself means.
Sixth, the Townley court failed to consider the significance of the 1972
amendment, in which Congress greatly expanded the scope of the 702
exemption."° The 1972 amendment suggested a congressional intent to
broaden the 702 exemption. The Townley court's failure to account for the
1972 amendment encourages the skeptical observer to speculate whether
the Townley court fell prey to one of the main dangers of using legislative
history to determine congressional intent:
The practical threat ...of pursuing unexpressed legislative
intents.., is that judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and
desires ....When you are told to decide, not on the basis of what
the legislature said, but on the basis of what it meant, and are
assured that there is no necessary connection between the two, your
best shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask yourself
what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; and that will
surely bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you
301
think it ought to mean ....

298. Justice Scalia persuasively makes this point:
[W]ith respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of construction reaching the courts,
there is no legislative intent, so that any clues provided by legislative history are
bound to be false. Those issues almost invariably involve points of relative detail,
compared with the major sweep of the statute in question. That a majority of both
houses of Congress (never mind the President, if he signed rather than vetoed the
bill) entertained any view with regard to such issues is utterly beyond belief. For
a virtual certainty, the majority was blissfully unaware of the existence of the issue,
much less had any preference as to how it should be resolved.
A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 32 (1997).
299. Id. at 17. Justice Scalia continues, "That seems to me the essence of the famous American
ideal set forth in the Massachusetts constitution: A government of laws, not of men. Men may
intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us." Id.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 116-21.
301. SCALIA, supra note 298, at 17-18. The American Trucking court recognized this danger
but suggested it was not fatal to the purposivist approach:
ANTONIN SCALIA,
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When judges limit themselves to interpreting the text of a statute, the
danger of pursuing their own objectives in interpreting the law is real.
However, when judges open themselves to the possibilities and promises
of interpreting what lawmakers meant instead of what lawmakers said, that
danger is both real and imminent.
Seventh, the legislative history can be used to support a drastically
different account of what Congress intended for the 702 exemption than
that adopted by the Townley court. For instance, in Little v. Wuerl,3° the
Third Circuit held that the 702 exemption allows religious employers to
require employees to conform their lifestyles - not just their religious
affiliation - to the teachings of the employer's religion. 3 In reaching this
expansive holding, the court looked to legislative history. The circuit court
admitted that "the legislative history never directly addresses the
[particular] question,"3 but nevertheless, the legislative history "suggests
that the sponsors of the broadened [702] exception [referring here to the
1972 amendment] were solicitous of religious organizations' desire to
create communities faithful to their religious principles."
After
reviewing the remarks of two senators,3 °6 the court concluded:

Obviously there is1danger that the courts' conclusion as to legislative purpose will
be unconsciously iifluenced by the judges' own views or by factors not
considered, y the enacting body. A lively appreciation of the danger is the best
assurance of escape from its threat but hardly justifies an acceptance of a literal
interpretation dogma which withholds from the courts available information for
reaching a correct conclusion.
United States v. Am. Trucking, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1939).
302. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991).
303. Id. at 950.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. The circuit court quoted remarks made by Senator Allen and Senator Ervin in the context
of the 1972 amendment. One sponsor claimed that "the establishment of church-related educational
institutions is the embodiment of the free exercise of religion. This form of religious activity has
always been recognized to occupy the same high estate under the first amendment as worshipping
in the churches and preaching from the pulpits." 118 Cong.Rec. 1994 (1972) (Senator Allen).
Another sponsor made it clear that the exception was intended to remove religious employers from
government scrutiny:
[Question]: Does the Senator's amendment limit itself to the opportunity of a
religious organization to have the right to hire people of its own faith? Is that the
limitation of the amendment?
Senator Ervin: I would allow the religious corporation to do what it pleased. That
is what my amendment would allow it to do. It would allow it liberty. It would
take it out from under the control of the EEOC entirely. 118 Cong. Rec. 1982
(1972).
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We recognize that Congress intended Title VII to free individual
workers from religious prejudice. But we are also persuaded that
Congress intended the explicit exemptions to Title VII to enable
religious organizations to create and maintain communities
composed solely of individuals faithful to their doctrinal practices,
whether or not every individual plays a direct role in the
"religious activities.". .. [W]e read the exemption
organization's
07
broadly.
Compared to the Townley opinion, this is a very generous reading of the
legislative history. It demonstrates just how malleable and unreliable
legislative history can be.
Although the Townley court likely reached the correct result, its
rationale is unpersuasive. Subsequent courts may rely on the reasoning in
Townley to reach the wrong conclusion.30 Arguably, this is what happened
in Kamehameha, where the Ninth Circuit followed its earlier reasoning in
Townley.3 °9 Parachurch organizations may be relieved that several of the
other federal circuit courts have adopted a more straightforward
interpretation of the 702 exemption.
VI. CONCLUSION

Parachurch organizations should qualify for the 702 exemption. First,
the statutory language is straightforward and clear: the Title VII prohibition
of religion-based discrimination "shall not apply . . . to a religious

corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to
the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work

307. Little, 929 F.2d at 951.
308. Is this too harsh a statement? When I presented this Article at a symposium at Notre
Dame Law School in April 2005, Professor Barbara Fick graciously suggested a more generous
assessment of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Townley. Indeed, one should acknowledge that the
court in Townley did adopt a flexible, fact-intensive test for determining whether an organization
qualified for the 702 exemption. EEOC v. Townely Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir.
1988). Instead of drawing a bright line and automatically disqualifying the defendant manufacturing
company on the grounds of the company's secularity, the Townley court stated: "[E]ach case must
turn on its own facts. All significant religious and secular characteristics must be weighed to
determine whether the corporation's purpose and character are primarily religious." Id.
Informatively, neither defendant nor plaintiff disputed this "'primarily religious' standard." Id. at
619. Depending on how it is applied, the balancing test arguably is a more generous standard to
apply. The key, however, is how it is applied. In applying the standard, it seems unlikely the
Townley court would not be influenced by its view of the statute and of congressional purpose in
enacting the statute. For this reason, the Townley court's use and understanding of legislative
history to interpret the statute and apply the standard are at least as relevant as the standard itself.
309. EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1993)
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connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.""' It is not too simplistic
to read this language and conclude that parachurch organizations are
"religious corporations," "religious associations," "religious educational
institutions," or "religious societies." The language of the statute does not
require that qualifying organizations be churches or closely affiliated with
churches.
Second, the relevant case law, culminating in LeBoon, supports the
proposition that parachurch organizations should qualify for the 702
exemption. The defendant organizations that failed to qualify for the 702
exemption either discriminated on a non-religious basis or are easily
distinguished from parachurch organizations.31' This conclusion is directly
supported by the holding in LeBoon, in which a Jewish Community Center
qualified for the 702 exemption and was Permitted to fire an evangelical
Christian employee for religious reasons.
Third, the interest of parachurch organizations in hiring only coreligionists has important social implications. The thousands ofparachurch
organizations currently operating in the United States313 boast combined
annual budgets of billions of dollars,314 serve millions of U.S. citizens each
year,3" 5 and often provide essential social services.3" 6 Religion is at the
heart of parachurch organizations and it would be unfortunate if the
government failed to free parachurch organizations "to create and maintain
communities composed solely of individuals faithful to their doctrinal
practices."317
The strong interest of parachurch organizations in "creat[ing] and
maintain[ing] communities composed solely of individuals faithful to their

310. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-I (West 2005).
311. The judge in LeBoon noted the significance of his own decision. Finding for the Jewish
Community Center, the judge said:
I note that this is a potentially significant finding not only for the [defendant], or
even for Jewish Community Centers, of which there are many, nationwide. A
Google; search turned up 4,340,000 hits for the term "Jewish Community Center,"
but also 2,490,000 for the term "Muslim or Islamic Community Center," 654,000
for "Hindu Community Center" and 577,000 for "Buddhist Community Center."
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, No. Civ.A.04-430, 2004 WL 2931268, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 16, 2004).
312. See supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
313. Hamilton, supra note 15.
314. Id.; Stafford, supra note 16, at 20, 23.

315. See supra note 78.
316. The factor that makes parachurch organizations different from other social service
providers, of course, is their religious motivation, related mission, and religious quality.
317. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991).
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doctrinal practices, ' 31
' 8 in combination with a sound reading of the statute
and the full weight of the relevant case law, makes a strong case for the
proposition that parachurch organizations should qualify for the 702
exemption.

318. Id.

